This article looks at the convictions and motives of Jacobus Arminius in relation to grace and sin. Arminius strove to maintain that salvation is by grace alone, and to remove the connection between God and sin. The author maintains that throughout history Arminius has not always been viewed fairly.

Source: Lux Mundi, 2009. 6 pages.

A New Perspective on Arminius

It is fully understandable that the name of Arminius provokes some resistance, also within our Christian Reformed Churches. Does his name not stand for a theological vision that awards a decisive role to man’s free will in the appropriation of salvation, at the cost of God’s sovereign grace? On 27th June 2008 I defended my dissertation on the theology of Arminius at the Theological University of Apeldoorn. The editors of De Wekker asked me to summarize my dissertation for the benefit of the readers.

My dissertation gave cause to some discussion and raised some questions in various newspapers and church magazines. In some cases the impression was wrongly given that it was my intention to rehabilitate Arminius or to put unreformed opinions in a positive light. During my research I discovered that surprisingly little research had been done on Arminius’ theology. Many books present a false portrayal of Arminius, information that is subsequently copied by others without reading Arminius himself. Everybody has a right to a fair judgement. That is why convictions should receive a true representation and motives should be traced. In my opinion, the important question of what exactly were Arminius’ theological motives to deviate from Reformed theology, had not yet been answered satisfactorily. In my dissertation I have tried to do Arminius justice by answering that question. It is indeed true that in this way a new perspective is gained on Arminius, a better understanding through which current images have to be corrected or nuanced. But that is not the same as agreeing with all Arminius has to say. I will come back to that point in part three of this article. Also, none of this in itself has any bearing on the Canons of Dort which refute the Remonstrants in five articles. After all, while it is true that the Remonstrants refer to Arminius, research – mine as well as others’ – has showed that a clear distinction should be made between Arminius and the Remonstrants. Condemnation of erroneous Remonstrant doctrine does not automatically result in a condemnation of (all of) Arminius’ views.

Arminius up till 1603🔗

Jacob Arminius was born in 1559 in Oudewater. His father died around that time and he lost his mother, sister and older brother(s) in the Spanish massacre of Oudewater in 1575. Arminius escaped a similar fate because he was studying at Marburg at the time. In 1576 Arminius enrolled at the University of Leiden; in 1582 at the University of Geneva, where Theodore Beza swayed the scepter. Besides Geneva, Arminius also studied for short periods in Basel, Zurich and Padua, before returning to Amsterdam in 1587, where he was ordained for the ministry in the following year.

One can deduce from various facts that around 1590 Arminius started to doubt the correctness of Beza’s influential supralapsarian doctrine of predestination (‘supralapsarianism’ means that God’s predestination applies to man before the fall). A certain Dirk Volckertsz Coornhert had criticized Beza’s predestination doctrine with the objection, amongst others, that it would warrant the conclusion that God is unjust. Two ministers from Delft who wanted to take the sting out of Coornhert’s criticism, defended an infralapsarian doctrine of predestination (‘infralapsarian’ means that God’s predestination applies to man after the fall). Arminius agreed with Coornhert’s criticism of Beza, but not with the alternative doctrine. In his view, infralapsarianism does not present a satisfactory solution either. The problem with the relationship between God’s justice on the one hand and predestination on the other, is so intriguing to Arminius that he spends the rest of his life pondering it.

Others, such as his colleague minister Petrus Plancius, noticed that on some points Arminius took a somewhat different view than what they were used to, for example in his sermons on Romans 7 and 9. Arminius defended his view on these chapters in two short papers that were not published until after his death. In his explanation of Romans 9, for example, Arminius claims that the text “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated” should be interpreted to mean that Jacob is a role model of those people who want to be justified through faith in Jesus Christ, while Esau is typical of those who reject the Gospel and try to gain salvation through their own works. According to Arminius, it is the ‘Jacobs’ who are elected to salvation by God, while the ‘Esaus’ are rejected.

In a correspondence with a Leiden University professor, Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), Arminius discusses the ‘object of predestination’. Simply stated, how does God view man at the ‘moment’ of predestination? Does He view him as still to be created, as created, or as created and fallen into sin? Arminius opts for the last possibility, because otherwise God would be the cause of the fall. He is convinced that if God were to elect or reject men who are not yet fallen, the fall would necessarily result from this predestination. In that case, God, and not man, would be responsible for sin, which would mean that God is unjust.

God’s Justice🔗

God’s justice increasingly becomes the centre and foundation of Arminius’ theology. God’s goodness and justice are unquestionable certainties for Arminius and every thought that tends to deviate from that is contradicted and attacked by him with great spirit. I will try to explain why.

God is just in his very essence; his justice is so fundamental that it is characteristic of all of God’s will and actions. God’s will, for example, is completely free (God is sovereign), but according to Arminius this can never result in God willing something that is unjust. Of course, this starting point has consequences for the way in which God created the world and man, as well as for the way in which He rules and maintains his creation (providence). God has equipped man with a free will – which is the essence of human nature – and made an agreement with man in the covenant of works that – on condition of total obedience – he would receive the joy of total reunion with God. God gave man all he needed in order to stay obedient, but completely voluntarily man chose to break the covenant with God (the fall).

On those grounds God had the right to give man what he deserved: damnation. His justice also demands it. Nevertheless, God wanted to show mercy to fallen man. The only way to do this without compromising God’s justice was through the substitutional suffering and death of God’s Son as Mediator. Jesus Christ had to appease God’s justice in our place in order to make the redemption of sinful men possible. For Arminius therefore the accomplished work of Christ is the absolute condition and foundation of the Gospel.

Faith and Means of Grace🔗

According to Arminius, the Gospel consists firstly of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ to satisfy God’s justice. Secondly, God determined that only people who are connected to Christ could be saved. Through faith, Christ’s righteousness would be applied to them, so that there would be no hindrance for God to accept man. That is also the reason why faith, as means and condition for the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, plays such an important role in Arminius’ theology. I already mentioned above that Arminius saw created and fallen man as the ‘object of predestination’. Because of the importance of faith for the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the sinner, Arminius in his view adds faith to the object of election: God elects believing sinners. He rejects unbelieving sinners.

According to Arminius, the new or Gospel covenant that God made with man after the fall includes, besides the gift of Christ and this condition concerning faith, also the gift of all the means of grace that man, fallen into sin, needs in order to believe in Christ, to repent and to be saved. For Arminius this, too, was linked directly to God’s justice: God did not exclude anyone when He made the new covenant. God demands faith in Christ from all people and it would therefore be unjust if God, together with the demand, did not also grant the grace necessary to meet it.

An objection that might be raised is that before the fall man had the power to believe, so that God is not obliged to grant that power again after the voluntary fall. God would have every right to demand faith from fallen man, even if it is impossible for him to meet this demand without grace. Arminius, however, answered that man before the fall did not have any power to believe in Christ. Before the fall there was no sin, and therefore no Christ as Mediator in whom man could or should believe. God’s demand of faith and conversion is based on the new situation of the new covenant after the fall. Moreover, God determined that those who do not believe in Christ should be punished eternally. Arminius was convinced that it would be unjust if God punished man for the omission of something of which he would never have been capable.

From Arminius’s point of view, in which it is above all doubt that the guilt of unbelief can only be blamed on man himself (because he sticks to his unbelief in spite of the Gospel and all the grace he receives), it is understandable that he teaches that God’s grace does not work irresistibly. If God’s grace works irresistibly, certain people who receive this grace, would necessarily be saved, while the rest would necessarily be lost, because they apparently did not receive (enough of) this irresistible grace. Arminius cannot harmonize grace working like that with God’s general offer of salvation. Arminius’ view of the non-irresistible nature of God’s grace, granted to everyone sufficiently, is directly linked with his view of God as the one who is just and acts justly. 

In his theology, Arminius placed a strong emphasis on God’s justice. So much so that he took this as his starting point and carefully worked out the consequences for his whole theology.

Freedom🔗

Justice presupposes freedom. Arminius endorsed this ancient concept. Justice, laws and prohibitions cannot function where there is no freedom. How can one be held responsible for an action if he has no possibility whatsoever to act differently? In principle, everyone agreed on this in Arminius’ day. However, views differed somewhat on the nature and degree of freedom necessary to hold someone responsible for his deeds. Following in the line of the teaching of Peter Martyr Vermigli, an important Reformed theologian of the 16th century, the predominant opinion in Arminius’ day was that the absence of coercion would be sufficient to establish responsibility. If you do something spontaneously and without coercion, that makes you responsible, even if you don’t have the possibility to act differently, and you therefore act from necessity.

Arminius did not share this opinion, however. He believed that man – after the Fall – still possessed the essential free will of choice given to him by God at his creation. Man could not lose that free will of choice as it is an essential element of humanity. Arminius was also convinced (as were his colleagues) that the Fall had very serious consequences, even to the extent that it was certain that man, despite his free will of choice, could never choose what is good if God – through grace – did not free the will from the bonds of sin, and continuously guide the human will.

Thus, in Arminius’ view on the relation between free will and grace, two things are very important: firstly, that our will to believe in Christ is always entirely and continually dependent on God’s grace; and secondly, that this grace of God does not influence the will irresistibly.

Duplex amor Dei🔗

Arminius summarized his theology in a concept that is unique, so far as I have been able to trace. He described the foundation of Christian religion as God’s twofold love, in Latin Duplex amor Dei. God’s first love concerns justice, and God’s second love, subordinate to the first, concerns man and his salvation. We have already seen the consequences of Arminius’ concept of justification with regard to God and His actions: it results in a strong emphasis on the fundamental place and function of Christ’s work of atonement, because God’s justice must be satisfied before He can be merciful to sinners. God wants all men to be saved (his second love), but not at the expense of his justice (his first love).

Another consequence of Arminius’ concept is that salvation within the covenant of grace applies to all men, and therefore everyone receives sufficient grace to be able to believe. This faith is important because it is the only God-given means through which a sinner can, by union with Christ, be declared justified by God. God gives faith, but not in an irresistible manner. If that were the case, it would not only damage the essence of freedom of the will, but, above all, also imply that those who are not saved did not receive sufficient grace to be able to believe, which would make God the cause of their sin and unbelief.

Arminius’ main objection to the doctrine of unconditional predestination, held by men such as Calvin, Beza and Gomarus, was that this view does not do justice to God’s twofold love, or reverses the priority of the two aspects. Arminius averred that a doctrine of unconditional predestination asserts that God loves man and man’s salvation before God’s justice has been satisfied by the sacrifice of Christ, accounted to the sinner through belief in Him. A doctrine of unconditional reprobation does not even do justice to God’s love of justice, nor to His love of man and his salvation.

God’s Relationship to Sin🔗

Concomitant with Arminius’ emphasis on God’s justice was his continual concern to prevent anyone thinking that God could in any way be the cause or the author of sin and evil. To him, such a thought was the greatest blasphemy imaginable, and above all disastrous for any kind of religion. Man can only begin to serve God if he is convinced that God is just; God’s justice is therefore his most important attribute, including in bringing man to serve and praise God. For who would obey God if he could not depend on God’s doing what He promises and threatens? That is why revelation and theology purpose to show that God is just. There is no positive relation between God and sin whatsoever. God hates sin and does everything to counter it. At the same time, He always takes into account the essential freedom which He granted man as creature. God will therefore not prevent sin in an irresistible manner. He permits it.

Arminius’ focus on God’s justice in relation to sin did not come out of the blue: since the beginning of the Reformation, important Reformed theologians suffered from the accusation that the consequence of their theology was that God was the cause of sin, and accordingly was unjust. Calvin, for example, was charged with this both from within and from without the Reformed movement. Calvin’s most important defense was always his reference to the limitations of sinful, human understanding: who are we, insignificant and sinful people, to measure the justice of God’s actions? God is just. He determines what is just, and if people feel Him to be unjust, that merely highlights the limitations of their own understanding.

After Calvin, the orthodox Reformed theologians were no longer satisfied with this defence. They seriously challenged the accusations, and tried to refute them with all sorts of rational explanations. For example, Vermigli (already referred to previously) was influential with his conviction that in addition to full freedom (which sinful man does not possess), a lack of coercion is also a sufficient condition to hold someone responsible for his deeds. Additionally, many (in our view, very subtle) distinctions were put forward to prove that God, in spite of appearances to the contrary, is not the author of sin.

Arminius himself referred to Beza, his teacher, as an example of one who admitted that if man had fallen into sin through the necessity of God’s determination, it could not be explained how God can be innocent and man guilty. According to Beza, however, we have to trust that there is no problem whatsoever with God’s justice. Moreover, like Calvin, he referred to our clouded reason, and the fact that God is unfathomable. Arminius believed that all is lost if we think in that direction. For him, God’s justice is not a confession of faith that must be adhered to against all apparent injustice by God, but a revelation from God that forms the grounds for faith and for our trust in Him and His honour.

In his theology, Arminius placed a strong emphasis on God’s justice. So much so that he took this as his starting point and carefully worked out the consequences for his whole theology. The other side to Arminius’ emphasis on God’s justice was his continual concern to avoid the suggestion that God could in any way be the cause or the author of sin and evil. Since the beginning of the Reformation, great Reformed theologians had suffered the reproach that their theology gave rise to such thinking. Calvin and many other Reformed theologians defended themselves against these accusations in various ways. How did that work out, and what effect did it have on theologians like Arminius who, while appreciating the intention behind all these defensive arguments, considered them in the final analysis to be invalid?

No longer Acceptable🔗

The view propounded by Calvin, Beza, Vermigli and others was becoming increasingly accepted among Reformed believers. For theologians who still thought or were starting to think differently, the operating space was becoming smaller; in some cases, a difference of opinion on this matter led to a voluntary or forced departure of the dissenters from their posts or from the church. Arminius himself thought that it was the very concept of God as the author of sin (developed from the views of Calvin and Beza) that was causing many to turn their back on the Reformed church, and which was also creating a stumbling block for others who wished to join. Seen from this perspective, it is understandable that Arminius also came up against some heavy opposition. It was not his view of God’s justice that met with sturdy criticism, but the consequences that this had for his comments on the atonement – the way grace works and the human free will to choose. This was already the case when he was minister in Amsterdam, and it intensified when he was appointed professor of theology at the University of Leiden in 1603.

Although the clashes accompanying Arminius’ appointment were resolved to full satisfaction by his colleague Franciscus Gomarus, it was the same Gomarus who, as early as 1604, sharply criticized Arminius for his view of predestination. This difference of opinion caused much uneasiness at the university, in the church, and in politics. The States of Holland and West-Friesland tried to mediate and bring about mutual toleration between the contending parties. The declaration made by Arminius before the States on 30th October 1608, in which he explained his theological view very explicitly (so he said), was an important step in this process. Indeed, Arminius did summarize his view very clearly and concisely in this explanation, including the concept of God’s twofold love. It is also one of his last writings as the tuberculosis, from which he had been suffering for years, worsened in 1609, leading to his death on 19th October of that same year. In the meantime, however, the discussion had resulted in the formation of strongly opposing parties, so that Arminius’ death did not bring about the end of the conflict. On the contrary, the battle truly flared up in 1610 and erupted to a full extent in the years following.

The Remonstrants🔗

In January 1610, around 40 ministers, led by Rev. W tenBogaert, summarized their views on the theological themes under discussion, and presented this document to the States of Holland. The five points in which they disclosed their views became known as the Five Articles of Remonstrance, and completely determined the subsequent course of the debate. Not only did the important conference in The Hague, the ‘Schriftelicke Conferentie’ of 1611, deal with these points, but we ourselves also encounter the Remonstrance in the chapter division of the Canons of Dordt, drawn up by the Synod of Dordt (1618/1619).

The Remonstrance discussed five controversial themes that were for the most part derived directly from Arminius’ own views: predestination, atonement, grace, the operation of grace, and perseverance. With the early Remonstrants, one could still recognize some of Arminius’ attention to God’s justice, but with the later Remonstrants not a trace of Arminius’ emphasis on this can be found, nor the fact that God’s justice formed the framework within which Arminius arrived at his views on these controversial themes. Neither did the Counter-Remonstrants enter into the arguments from the starting point of God’s justice. As a result, despite the somewhat literal similarity between Arminius and the Remonstrants, a clear distinction must be made between the two. The controversial themes started to have a life of their own, cut loose as they were from the framework of God’s justice in which Arminius had placed them.

For example, free will of choice, seen separately from the framework of God’s justice and grace, in which Arminius had placed it, could easily become an end in itself. Among the early Remonstrants – even taking into account a great mutual diversity – one sees a tendency towards moralism and anthropocentrism, whereas the Synod of Dordt (1618/1619) maintained the sola gratia principle of the Reformation: our salvation is not dependent on our efforts but is on account of God’s grace alone!

New Perspective🔗

I started with the remark that the name of Arminius stands for a theological view that awards a decisive role to man’s free will in the appropriation of salvation, at the expense of God’s sovereign grace. Concluding my summarized reproduction of Arminius’ theological views, we now address ourselves to the question whether that opinion is in fact correct. Did not Arminius teach ‘free will’? What is the ‘new perspective’ on Arminius brought forward by my research? I would like to select a few main points.

In the first place, it is evident that Arminius’ alternative viewpoint did not arise from resistance to God’s sovereignty, against the Reformed sola gratia (by grace alone), or because he wished to claim an independent position for man (autonomy) next to God. Not man, but God and His justice formed the starting point for Arminius’ way of thinking; his motive was not anthropological, it was theological.

In the second place, it is evident that Arminius always carefully guarded against the possibility that his view of man’s enduring free will of choice should be at the expense of man’s dependence on God’s grace. Without free will, man would not be man, and God would be the author of sin; for Arminius, both consequences were perfectly clear, and completely unacceptable. Therefore man has free will of choice, but it is so tainted by sin that he is always utterly dependent on God’s grace for any good deed such as exercising faith. He is permanently dependent on God’s grace. Moreover, God opposed faith to works: how then could faith – compared by Arminius to the empty hand of a beggar – ever become an accomplishment that man could boast about to God?

In the third place, it is evident that Arminius’ view of God’s justice leads to a firm emphasis on the central and fundamental position of Christ and his substitutionary sacrifice: no grace without reconciliation and atonement! Christ has earned our salvation, and however necessary faith may be for receiving Christ’s righteousness to our account, it can add nothing to it.

In the fourth place, Arminius evidently speaks completely asymmetrically about the causes of condemnation and redemption: due to his stubborn resistance against God’s plentiful grace, man is the only cause of his condemnation – he has earned it. The other side of the coin is not that man can also earn his salvation; on the contrary: salvation is completely by grace, underserved, and even runs counter to works and merits.

All questions answered?🔗

So, are all questions about Arminius’ theology now answered? Not in the least. For example, the question whether the sola gratia is absolutely safe with Arminius is of vital importance. The outcome of my research does, however, place this question in a different perspective. Among other things, that perspective consists of the four points I mentioned above, on the grounds of which we can at least state that it was Arminius’ intention to hold fast to the biblical and reformational ‘by grace alone’. He was convinced that his theology also fully honoured the ‘one hundred percent grace’ character of salvation. At the same time, he wished to preclude that God should be accused of injustice, of causing or wishing sin. Arminius also recognized that it was not Calvin’s intention, nor that of most of his colleagues, to make God the author of sin. Yet he was convinced that this was the consequence of their theology. That is why he rejected their views on those points, and attempted to obviate these consequences in his own theological perspective.

Based on the outcome of my research into Arminius’ theological motives and convictions, I am of the opinion that up to the present day very few, whether friend or foe, have done Arminius full justice. My hope is that my dissertation will bring about some change to that.                                                                                                                                     

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