Freedom and the democratic rule of law⤒🔗

Christian politics takes place within the framework of the democratic constitutional state. Because it loves freedom, it accepts democracy. It regards the democratic constitutional state as an instrument to guarantee everyone’s freedom. Many authors have emphasized that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Dutch civil liberties were born out of a struggle for freedom of conscience and religion. Freedom of conscience—the freedom to believe what one wants—is thus seen as the basis of all other freedoms; it goes hand in hand with respect for the motives and convictions of every human being. People are not excluded from a society or from the decision-making structures when they harbour different views than others. Thus it can be said that Protestantism served as the cradle of democracy.

In this view, respect for everyone’s freedom is the cornerstone of the democratic constitutional state. The central notion is that there should be no political coercion, persecution or violence where people’s deepest convictions are concerned. Starting from this central idea, Christian politics has embraced the democratic constitutional state. More precisely, the rule of law is a condition and starting point for democracy. Democracy rests on fundamental principles of law and justice, and gives expression to these. In the wake of this, the idea naturally develops that political power is best spread among many. When power is monopolized by a few, the interests of many are soon placed in jeopardy. That is why it is good that citizens can participate in decision-making and that political power is held accountable. True appreciation of freedom and a regulation for the proper handling of power lies at the heart of Christian political thought. The suggestion that convictions should be changed through majority coercion is therefore met with principled resistance.

This does not detract from the fact that governments also deal with power in a democratic state under the rule of law and that ongoing reflection on this power is called for, also in Christian politics. While it is true that "freedom" is more original than "power" in the concept of democracy (which is why the exercise of power must in principle be limited), the exercise of power and authority should not be discredited by Machiavellianism and bad intentions. Power is an essential element of government authority. The term cannot be ignored in a Christian political reflection. However, government power should not suppress other authorities that exist in society (the principle of sovereignty within its own sphere), but should allow doing justice to them. In this way, power and freedom can achieve a balance that is conducive to healthy social development.

In this chapter we define our attitude towards modern democracy. Democracy is not an "unambiguous" concept. It concerns a combination of formulated rights, democratic institutions, behaviours and attitudes. Reflection is always necessary, simply because democracy is a living political reality. There is also the question of when there is majority coercion instead of freedom. In recent years, more and more attention has been given to the "democratic attitude" of citizens. They are asked to respect the institutions of democracy. This chapter deals with the fundamental questions associated with democracy and not yet with the design and structure of democracy and new propositions in that area (such as referenda, direct democracy, and so on). That subject will be dealt with in the final chapter. Since much has been said about freedom and basic rights in this book, I will now start with a reflection on power.

The temptation of power←⤒🔗

“Don’t you understand at all that I want power!?” No, it is not Napoleon or Hitler who is saying this but the social democrat Willy Brandt. He proclaimed this to his wife on the eve of his career in German politics. The desire for power is certainly not typical of German or French politicians only. Politics is coveted because of its power. Nietzsche already spoke of the “Wille zur Macht” [the will to seek power] that people supposedly possess. For some, it is at the heart of politics. That core is attractive and dangerous at the same time. Good things come about through the use of power. Who would not want to be just as powerful and change certain things? Everyone realizes that abuse of power is always around the corner and that it has led to some of the worst violations of human rights. Power is also addictive to those who possess it. How much effort does it sometimes take those in power to relinquish power?

In the previous chapter we saw that without power an authority cannot maintain itself in a society. In a world in which evil is becoming established, the use of means of power is required in order for a society to function. A "big stick" is needed to get people to do what needs to be done. Power can be defined as the ability to coercively influence people’s behaviour. It is about the ability to exercise real authority. Authority is realized through the use of power. But the exercise of power must be legitimized, because it intrudes on people’s existence. Hence Max Weber’s definition of authority as the legitimate form of domination. However, power, understood as the ability to influence people’s behaviour, can be used for good and for evil. Power can derail, but it can also liberate. That is why power must be accounted for. It is not removed from human meaning. What is decisive is in what name or according to what principle power is exercised.

Reflection←⤒🔗

In the New Testament, power is not simply qualified as a negative concept. In addition to the concept of "exousia" (competence), the concept of "dunamis" functions. The latter concept stands for strength or power. This can be a quality (a charisma) of a person, an institution or a process. As such, it can have a decidedly positive meaning. The kingdom of God breaks through with "power.” Rulers who know how to impose their will also have "dunamis.” The term can also have a negative meaning: the power of evil also has its own "force" (see, for example, Revelation 17:13). The concept is an indication of powerful rule and does not directly have a legal qualification ("legitimized power"). It has a concrete and direct charge: powerful things are happening, irresistible, irrefutable, and inexorable. We see this happening concretely when a certain political will is adamantly implemented. Not only by the "exousia,” but especially through this "dunamis,” events and developments are set in motion and underlying rulers demand respect. It is this "dunamis,” this world-changing quality, that makes power so attractive to people. Earthly power resembles this divine “dunamis" and sometimes makes those in power (and even sports heroes) feel like they are the sons of the gods. This "dunamis" yields the satisfaction of successful action. In reality this earthly power is always fallible, unstable, temporary and corruptible.

Nevertheless, earthly powers are continually magnifying themselves, with varying degrees of success. These need not only be political powers, but also include economic, technical and financial institutions. According to Griffioen and Schuurman, we can think of "autonomous realms of reality" here. Science can be such a force, as can technology and the economy. The development of power can be so strong that they acquire authority everywhere and forcefully influence people’s behaviour. They are powers that function like an idol for the people. We have already seen that Calvin calls the human heart an idol-factory and Martin Buber already pointed to the many gods that arise in a secularized world.

Goudzwaard has drawn attention to the four aspects of modern idolatry: (1) something of creation is set apart as something "sacred" and therefore receives an independent character; (2) people then make sacrifices for this particular idol; they get down on their knees for it; (3) self-responsibility is abdicated; the idol turns into the law in men’s lives, and (4) the idol becomes a healer, a saviour, someone or something that creates happiness, health and prosperity. Deep down these powers are spiritual in nature; they are ideologies that can take hold of us. They can take on a very tangible form in a world of telecommunications, laboratories, stock markets, bio-industry, flash capital, genetic engineering, mass media, experimental space travel, and the like.

In addition to these forms of scientific, technical, and economic power, there is the phenomenon of political power, to which I will now confine myself. Political power has traditionally been one of the most persuasive forms of power because of its link to physical means of violence. Here, too, there can be such a strong element of independent privatization that power takes on demonic traits. When such power gets into the hands of a single individual, then the worst must be feared. Don’t the worst abuses of power take place under tyranny, dictatorship, or absolute kingship? Plato still believed that autocracy was the best form of government, provided the ruler was a wise man. This view is now regarded as one of Plato’s greatest mistakes. It is the few in history who became tyrannical. In each case it is an aristocratic elite, a revolutionary vanguard, a clique of regents or a small group of administrators who know how to monopolize political power and then use it for their own ends. They turn power into a private asset, while it should be in the service of public justice.

Power and democracy in historical perspective←⤒🔗

That power and public accountability belong together is an ancient and also a Biblical fact, but was rediscovered in the sixteenth century. In response to medieval autocracy and royal absolutism, it has been argued that society is a res publica: a matter for all. It was recognized that citizens who sustain a society, who ensure its prosperity and growth, should also have a say in matters of public interest. Citizens no longer accepted that a few monarchs decided everything. At the time of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this view focused on the division of political power. There were Calvinist constitutional lawyers who began to think about the right of resistance and the division of political power. These so-called monarchomachs ("kingslayers") laid the foundations for new democratic political forms. Power needed to be provided with a countervailing power, both within political societies themselves and in an international context. The purpose of this was to preserve freedom for Protestantism in Europe. William of Orange, Maurice and stadtholder/king William III opposed Catholic absolutism in Europe. In particular, the latter was a statesman who carefully tried to maintain the balance of power in Europe.

The commitment to democratic relations had a political and a social component. Johannes Althusius attempted to connect the two in his Politica. To him, the experiences of the Netherlands were a shining example. He saw free citizens who, in consultation with each other, as social "allies,” were able to shape a free society. Such a society also needs governments, but these are to be subservient to a free social development. When they get in the way of this, they are not fulfilling their "servitude" properly and should be criticized. In Althusius’ work the seeds of democratic relations were sown, of the possibility of making political power subservient to social freedoms and, if necessary, criticizing it if it strays from this path.

Althusius’ ideas were extremely modern for his time and still reflected an ideal that needed to be worked on. In reality, many freedoms generally remained limited and it was and remained a struggle to persuade monarchs to share power or to grant freedoms. On what basis could citizens exert their influence? English political thinkers, following Locke, had come to regard property as the basis of political influence—only the aristocracy had power in addition to the king. Radical French Enlightenment thinkers used that reasoning to advocate influence for those without property. Why should the wealthy run society any better than the wealthy? Should we not regard the people as bearers of the public good? Especially with Rousseau this led to a complete reversal of perspective: it was not the monarch or the aristocracy that bore sovereignty, but the people.¹

The next step in this process was, if possible, even more radical. Why should a sovereign people have to live by the values and norms traditionally imposed by the leading elite? Was the close connection between political and ecclesiastical power not an instrument in the hands of an elite few who were out to control the people through religion? Wasn’t legislation and jurisprudence also imbued with representations that had to do with the views of a property-owning elite? Didn’t this entire political system function to maintain the power of that elite? If a society is not only a community of rights and interests, but also a community of values, how do those values come about? According to Rousseau, in all matters the "will of the people" should have the final word. Everyone now knows what excesses followed. During the French Revolution and later in Communism, the “will of the people” was as absolutistically implemented as the former “will of the monarch.” In this way of thinking, common norms and values were therefore decided centrally.

Two variants←⤒🔗

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the cradle of modern democracy. Two variants developed, which are still recognizable today as powerful democratic traditions. One variant focuses on the political process in a narrow sense. It is about participation, control, public accountability of power, shared governance. The basic idea here is that anyone who bears responsibility for the public good should also have the opportunity to participate in the discussion of that public good. This is an entirely defensible position. It is quite right that political policy should be based on the consent of those who have rights and interests. There is a lot of discussion about the form in which this should take place (direct or indirect democracy) and I will say something about that a little later. This emphasis on power sharing and participation in the political process by lawmakers and stakeholders has marked the Anglo-Saxon democratic system. It is a form of democracy that focuses on participation and decision-making rights. At the same time, it is assumed that the government should interfere as little as possible with an individual’s life.

In addition, another variant of democracy developed, which is more strongly influenced by the thinking of the French Enlightenment and which places more emphasis on government by the people as such. In this variant, the issue of the creation of common norms and values is a central theme. A society is led by common norms and values that should be legitimized in the democratic process. They must be laid down in a constitution, which is said to contain the will of the people. This variant entails its own discussions, which we will address in this chapter. After all, there are different views in a society about what is good and valuable for society. There are different ideas about values that citizens should uphold together. Can one group impose its values on another group through the state? That should not happen, but in the meantime it cannot be denied that even in a democratic society, a number of basic principles will have to be shared in order for this society to function.

There is one more aspect that needs to have our attention. In Western society, democracy fulfills an important function as a platform for the exchange of opinions between population groups. In combination with the modern media, it makes clear which opinions are current and which of them can count on a lot or little support. Ideas about policy, state organization and moral issues can be exchanged and discussed. The appreciation of democracy is also an appreciation of the associated political culture of free exchange of opinion. This political culture creates its own forms and behaviours. This is how we see the stratification of the concept of democracy: initially, issues of power sharing and tolerance from the point of view of common interests and rights; next the attention for the design of a community of values; and finally, a democratic system that also brings a democratic culture to life.

Christian politics and democracy←⤒🔗

Democracy is a great achievement. It protects vital freedoms and rights of citizens and regulates the controlled exercise of government power. Modern democracy, which broke ground through the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, shifted politics from the state to society. The monopolization of state power by the individual or the clique is made impossible by a form of government in which the people ultimately decide. Subjects are protected from autocratic rulers. The people experience their own freedom in a democracy. At the same time, this is where the downside of democracy begins. Freedom can be used positively and negatively. In this way, in addition to a civic sense, democracy can also nurture and protect anti-social behaviours and community-undermining individualism. Modern democracy has developed on the basis of values that can be undermined by the people themselves. Democracy as a decision-making structure does not of itself produce guiding principles. This is its perennial deficit, which continually provokes normative discussions about the democratic spirit needed to support it. Values are needed for the common enterprise of democracy to function properly.

A democracy cannot therefore function without recognition of values on which it is apparently based. Illustrative of this is the discussion that has arisen since the arrival of Islam. The question is asked whether this religion has values that support democracy. Democracy is more than only a decision-making process. It is also about the active recognition of public values, the mutual recognition of fundamental rights and a form of tolerance that actively protects the freedoms of the citizens. Social freedom is a "public interest,” says Veling, but this public interest can only be recognized and actively supported on the basis of values that people embrace. A democracy functions by virtue of a consensus, but this always requires maintenance. That is what everyday political debate is all about. This debate focuses on three cores: 1) democracy as a system of procedures; 2) as an expression of everyone’s rights; and 3) as an expression of recognized values. I will now deal with these three core concepts and give an evaluation as to whether these are sufficient for a democratic culture.

Democratic procedures←⤒🔗

According to some, the meaning of a democracy consists solely in following democratic procedures and can exist on that basis. Democracy is like a toolbox of rules that reasonable citizens can use to organize their social lives together. If the rules of democracy have been formally acted upon, the outcome should be respected. That is the minimum requirement—and therefore for some the maximum—of democracy.

When World War II ended, Karl R. Popper wrote his now famous The Open Society and its Enemies (1945). The open society he sought to defend was that of Western democracy. Its enemies were fascism and communism, which advocated a totalitarian, "closed" society. In a closed society people are not free, and a shared idea of a utopia to be realized is imposed on all. In contrast, Popper argues for a society where people are not in a predetermined way part of a class or forced to participate in some collective project. People are free individuals who enter into democratic discussion with each other to organize their society. Guided by their reason, they will jointly seek out what is best for society through this democratic consultation. Popper’s proposition focuses on the democratic procedure, but at the same time is not detached from certain values. He starts from man’s ability to reason and presupposes man’s free and equal position in society.

Popper belongs to the tradition of the positivists and the liberal political thinkers, which begins roughly in the eighteenth century with the philosopher Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant stated in his political philosophy that the state cannot arrive at a representation of the "common good.” Only individuals can determine for themselves what “good” means to them. The state must therefore stay out of this; it is not a "welfare machine" and certainly not a totalitarian power in people’s lives. The only thing is that man should not be deprived of his freedom and equality. The state needs to confine itself to establishing a constitutional, justice-based state, with a highly formalized character. We also recognize this commitment with the influential liberal thinker Rawls in our present day. In his A Theory of Justice (1971) he focuses on the organization of our contemporary society as a contract of reasonable, free and equal people.

The core idea of Kant, Popper and Rawls is always that people should not be forced to have an idea, goal or aspiration that they have not chosen themselves. The democratic procedure should guarantee the complete absence of coercion. It should be clear that in this approach a predetermined truth or common vocation cannot be addressed. In this view, politics is an arbiter between individuals and groups in society. There is hardly any room in this thinking for an independent position of the government, acting on its own responsibility. All the government has to do is make itself as unobtrusive as possible, asking as little as possible of its citizens and leaving the people their free choice.

This liberal idea of democracy is also influential in practical politics. In a plural and individualized society, politics merely mediates and plays the role of a referee. The correctness of the formal procedure must then guarantee the correctness of the result. With regard to heavily charged moral subjects, such as abortion and euthanasia, politicians prefer to use a procedural ethic. The political debate is then no longer about right and wrong, but about the quality of rules and requirements of due diligence. Such a debate is determined by the fear that one group of society will force its moral beliefs on others. The drawback of this, however, is that moral convictions are no longer discussed in democratic deliberations. This shows the deficiency of this formal conception of democracy. The emphasis on democratic procedures means that the moral convictions that are present in society are no longer acknowledged, confirmed or protected. It is unsatisfactory and even detrimental to political life that these beliefs are not recognized or serve as a guideline within the democratic process.

Democratic rights←⤒🔗

Do democratic rights then form the very nucleus of democracy? Has democracy not begun to protect those who are governed against the power of the rulers? When asked about the values of democracy, reference is made to the system of basic and political rights that guarantees the freedoms of the citizens. Classic fundamental rights include freedom of religion, freedom of education, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of expression. These areas of freedom are also referred to as the "no-state-zone," with the understanding that the government will not interfere with these freedoms. Classic fundamental rights make a free social life possible. In addition, more specific political rights could be considered (universal suffrage for men and women, active and passive voting rights, free and secret elections, democratic control of elected administrators, and so on). In R.A. Dahl’s influential theory of democracy, these classical basic rights and political rights together form the core of a truly democratic system. This is certainly a self-evident idea within the Anglo-Saxon system. The identification of democracy with the "state-free sphere" is strongly present in this. Within this system, fundamental social rights, which do not aim at a power-free atmosphere, but oblige the government to intervene, have also never developed properly.

However, two problems arise when the protection of rights is regarded as the exclusive core of a democracy. The starting point of this theory is the autonomy of individuals and groups. Their freedoms are protected and respected. However, the democratic process means that this autonomy continues to expand and deepen. Individuals and groups can fight for ever greater freedoms and rights in parliament and through legislation, in the name of their autonomy. People seek to have their rights recognized. A government that honours this has its hands full with all the claims. In this context one can also think of the far-reaching democratization wishes of citizens who want to make use of their political rights (participation, co-decision and assent). Finally, one could think of the increasing use of the judiciary in civil matters. Lawsuits to gain justice or to obtain large compensations are part of such a "claims-society.” However, the reliance on the courts for the public society is at the same time a sign of weakness. There are apparently no other ways to reach consensus.

Both enforcement and protection of rights are an important core of a democracy. There are fundamental rights that should not be changed just like that. Its protection is a task of the democratic constitutional state. But democracy as a system of rights raises the problem of power again. The authority of the state is necessary to effectuate the observance of rights in society. But this may not become an exercise of power in favour of private objectives. A realization is needed that a universal public justice must be served. But will a social group that wants to assert its rights by seizing power through the formation of a majority be held back from this? Compliance with democratic rights can therefore always degenerate into the exercise of power for the benefit of a private interest. Democracy understood exclusively as a system of rights is therefore an ambivalent concept. It requires stronger support from a democratic culture.

Democratic values←⤒🔗

The last dimension of the concept of democracy brings us to democratic values. A democracy is indeed about values. It also came about on the basis of certain values. I already pointed to freedom of conscience and religion as the cradle of political freedoms. Respect for the other as the bearer of his or her own convictions is essential for the emergence of democratic relationships. This also is at the start of the recognition of equality: people with a conviction on an equal footing. The basis here is therefore respect for the other as a unique being and the duty to refrain from coercion and violence in dealing with others. In political practice, this takes the form of democratic freedom and equality.

The French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) stated in his book on democracy in America (which he wrote after a study trip) that the characteristic value of democracy is equality. He was convinced that democracy was on a triumphant march in America and also in Europe. He argued that it not only arose on the basis of the understanding that people are equals, but also promoted equality between people. In America, where no aristocracy existed, it could be seen that equality in people’s conditions and positions led to equality in responsibilities and rights. This equality then fed civic pride, aversion to centralized power, and local democracy. According to De Tocqueville, this equality was consistent with the Biblical understanding that all men are equal before God.

Equality and freedom are core values of democracy. In the European context, these words have acquired a strong ideological meaning. In the name of equality we have seen the resistance against social inequality and difference in position, responsibility and prosperity. In the name of freedom all authority that did not emanate from people themselves was abandoned. Such concepts have since been incorporated into legislation, converted into legal principles and made into everyday democratic practice. We talk about equality in terms of procedural equality: equal access to services, equality before the law, equal treatment. We talk about freedom in terms of our democratic rights: freedom of speech, freedom of education, political freedoms. It is the minimum consensus necessary for democratic institutions to function. When elections have been free and fair, we can accept the result. When there is equality before the law, we can abide by the judge’s decision. These general values thus form the basis of a democratic system.

For a Christian the true meaning of freedom is responsibility before God, and public justice is the meaning of equality. For the humanist, equality stands for the elimination of any social, cultural or societal inequality, and freedom is the autonomy of the individual. The political debate revolves around these differences. The democratic values that people share in practice are filled in, interpreted and explained in different ways with a view to legislation. That does not make those democratic values, which we claim to defend in the Western world, the strongest of all. They are made strong by virtue of a practical consensus. Although it is rooted in the culture of democracy, when someone gains a majority to abolish it, he can override this culture and these values. Democracy’s values depend on stronger values that sustain it. Could this be the reason why Christian thinkers paid more attention to the power of norms and values in society?

The indispensability of authority←⤒🔗

It is time to take stock. Democracy can be approached as a combination of rules, rights and values. They are in turn referred to as the core of the concept of democracy, depending on the nature of the political philosophy adhered to. I have no qualms about considering all three cores as an essential part of democracy. However, all these cores contain shortcomings and together they are not strong enough to firmly establish democracy in the political arena. A democracy functions on the basis of a practical consensus, not because it has already solved all the questions. It represents a form of government that is the "least of all evils,” as the saying goes. Because of its fragility, however, it needs the support of stronger values, dispositions, and opinions in society that properly sustain it. A public morality is needed regarding people, society, culture and government in order to give substance and direction to democracy. It could also be expressed in this way: the structures of democracy (rules, rights and values) receive their direction from the basic beliefs in society. In a democratic society, political parties are expected to represent and contribute to the basic beliefs present in society.

However, this is not all that can be said about this matter. The above analysis of key democratic questions showed that democracy is unable to think for itself without appealing to a higher power, whichever approach one chooses. If one sees democracy as a system of rules, one cannot avoid the fact that there will be an authority that decides in any case. If one sees democracy as a system of rights, then power is needed to effectuate those rights. If one sees democracy as a system of values, then a political will is needed to live up to those values. All this points to the inescapability of governmental authority with its own position and responsibility. Democracy, rooted in the sphere of a civil society, cannot replace it. Ultimately, there needs to be a body that draws a conclusion from the democratic deliberation and grants authority and leverage to that conclusion. This means that we need to make a distinction between democracy as a deliberative and decision-making system and the government giving authority to certain decisions in its own responsibility. In the implementation of this "right to decide,” the government will focus on the outcome of democratic consultations, yet it will nevertheless retain its own responsibility in this respect. It is the government that extends force to a decision. Now it also becomes clear why democratic rules, rights and values are relatively weak: they lack the "dunamis" that is unique to government.

Christian political thinking has always emphasized this independent task of the government. It has never wanted to legitimize the exercise of authority by the government on the basis of democracy. The power of government remains an independent competency, also in relation to the democratic consultation of citizens. However, that government power must not fall into the hands of a few who use it for their own interests. The power of the state should benefit everyone and is therefore bound by norms that do not arise from any private or particular person. Higher than democracy, higher also than the power of the government is the idea of public justice as the Bible speaks of it. Democracy is not above it, but remains subject to it through the government. Enforcing public justice remains the unique vocation of government, which it also has to fulfill where there is no democracy (although public justice is difficult to imagine without democratic relations). A democracy is a system for making free and responsible people aware of their rights and for giving a voice as lawmakers and interested parties in social consultation and decision-making processes. Democratization should not mean that the government is disregarded in its own calling and with its exclusive disposal of government power.

The view that the government is merely a neutral agency, implementing what has emerged in the democratic process, is much too simplistic. The government acts and can also act on its own responsibility, having heard the outcome of the democratic process of consultation. It has its own authority. Even in a democratic society, power, no matter how limited and controlled it may be, retains its own dynamics. That’s why it remains so coveted. It is in this power that a government needs to be held accountable for the divine calling it has to guide and direct society. The "dunamis" of government is not of men, but of God (see John 19:11). In practice, however, the government will only be able to effectuate this when executives and ministers feel bound to God in their consciences. The view attributed to Abraham Kuyper that he would be in favour of a neutral state must therefore be eradicated. The state is never neutral. Its normative intervention in society depends precisely on the interpretation that governments give to their task.